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Thinking Space: 
Property speculation, global capital, urban planning and financialization: Sydney Boom, 
Sydney Bust Redux 
 
Abstract: 
In this Thinking Space essay, we revisit Maurie Daly’s 1982 book, Sydney Boom, Sydney 
Bust, fuelled by concern for how Australian cities are being transformed by financialised real 
estate. Daly’s insights remain highly relevant to Sydney and other cities around Australia and 
the world today. Poorly planned densification, inflated property markets, land speculation, 
and housing poverty are all outcomes of the (global) capitalist intersection of finance and 
land in Australia. The overwriting of Aboriginal country with colonial-capitalist systems of 
land ownership set in train a process of land and housing booms, bubbles and busts that are 
better understood by their circular continuity, rather than as a set of ephemeral ruptures. It is 
the property and finance system itself, rather than any ruptures to it, that reproduces unequal 
and alienating social relations. Researchers investigating property speculation, global capital, 
urban planning and financialization, we argue, ought to revisit this key text to inform their 
contemporary analyses. Moreover, those wielding power over Australian urban affairs would 
do well to read it too, lest its lessons be ignored for another generation. 
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Introduction 
Australian cities are awash with construction activity. From Collingwood to Kogarah, 
Marrickville to Newstead, every passing month seems to bring with it a new, sold-off-the-
plan high-rise apartment tower. Real estate, it seems, is the true national sport. Indeed, 
Australia now hosts the world’s most active market for securitized home loans (Reuters 
2017) and has the world’s second highest (and rising) levels of household debt (Stewart 
2017). There are reportedly more cranes in the east coast capital cities than in the entire 
continent of North America (Letts 2016). And with the cranes and high-rise towers, come 
social problems and no respite from affordability crises: overcrowded schools, longer 
working hours to pay off mortgages, worsening homelessness. It is perhaps no surprise, then, 
that in recent polls (Nicholls 2017), densification and housing affordability are among the 
issues of most concern to Australian voters.  
 
Yet debates about land and housing crisis in Australia are nothing new (Dufty-Jones 2018). 
Indeed, the languages that have formulated around land and housing booms and busts over 
the last 200-odd years are fabulously revealing. One of the first examples of an anti-land 
speculation measure appeared in 1812, when Governor Macquarie inserted a clause into each 
colonial land grant that forbade the resale of the granted land for a period of five years. 
Macquarie ‘had found as very prevalent practice “the obtaining grants for the sole purpose of 
selling them”’ (Roberts 1924, 21, citing Macquarie). Toward the end of the century, in 1889, 
Harold Sparks was reported in a Sydney newspaper to be ‘A Victim of the Land Boom… The 
cause of insolvency is given as land speculation’ (Evening News 1889, 5). By the turn of the 
century, in 1898, George Sutherland was waxing lyrical in a book chapter titled ‘Land 
Booms’ under the subtitle ‘City Investments’: 
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City land booms have always been a snare of the people of the Australian colonies. 
Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide have been each in its turn badly smitten by the 
mania for gambling building allotments… But the memories of commercial disaster 
soon wear off, and when another spell of buoyant, confident, hopefulness and 
extravagance takes possession of the community, the same wild speculation and the 
same inevitable collapse of credit ensure… These booms were only repetitions, on a 
larger scale, of what had already taken place repeatedly from the very earliest colonial 
days. In 1842, both in Sydney and Melbourne, business was so brisk and town 
properties passed from hand to hand so rapidly that almost everyone seemed to be 
making a fortune. (Sutherland 1898, 211-2). 
Concerned with present day real estate speculation and its impacts in Australian cities, but 
also seeking to understand continuities with the past, in this Thinking Space essay we revisit 
the Australian geographer Maurie Daly’s 1982 classic, Sydney Boom, Sydney Bust: The City 
and Its Property Market, 1850-1981 (Daly 1982). Revisiting Daly’s book at this point in 
Australia’s land and housing history seems timely, for two reasons. First, we seek to 
illuminate Daly’s ideas and show their continued relevance. The discipline of geography – 
with its focus on spatiality and temporality, time and space, process and events – has always 
been well placed to critically intervene into public debates that have a long and sometimes 
obscure spatiotemporal tail, such as land and housing booms and busts. Indeed, the key 
analytical tools of spatiality and temporality allow geographers to separate out a longue durée 
of continuity from the rupture of an isolated event. Daly documents how land and housing 
booms, bubbles and busts have been continually creating and destroying the fortunes of the 
colonisers since soon after the founding of the colony. The overwriting of Aboriginal 
peoples’ land management practices with white colonial systems of land management did not 
result in a financially stable system of land and housing management. Rather it set in train a 
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process of land and housing booms, bubbles and busts that are better understood by their 
circular continuity than as a set of ephemeral ruptures that this temporal language seems to 
suggest. This is the central analytical point of Sydney Boom, Sydney Bust.  
 
Second, we want to retrieve from Sydney Boom, Sydney Bust insights that will benefit 
contemporary scholarship. A book in many ways decades ahead of its time, Sydney Boom, 
Sydney Bust anticipated the recent explosion of academic work on financialisation, 
globalisation and real estate (cf. Christophers 2015), as well as a growing contemporary 
literature critical of the function of urban planning practice engulfed by neoliberal ideologies 
(e.g. Schatz and Rogers 2016; Greco 2018; Inch 2018). Urban planning has manifested as a 
tool for guiding and driving property development when it should be used as a mechanism for 
creating a more just or socially equitable city. We then reflect on what Daly brought to light 
and what he left in the dark with his analysis (notably, critique of the colonial dispossession 
of Aboriginal land), with future prospects for critical research on urban property markets in 
mind.  
    
Centring global capital in land and housing markets 
At the heart of Sydney Boom, Sydney Bust is the fortification of global capital, particularly 
within the financial service sector, through urban property and infrastructure development. It 
is a scholarly theme Daly returned to throughout his career (see, for example, Daly et al. 
(1996) and Stimson et al. (1998) on the role of foreign investment in Australian cities in the 
1990s). Global capital also has a longer history in Australia in relation to land than is 
generally understood. In 1804, Governor King lamented that the over-production of 
agricultural produce in the colony was just as difficult to manage as under-production, and ‘in 
the last few years of King’s rule, the Isle of France, Tahiti and the outlying settlements were 
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all considered as possible markets’ (Roberts 1924, 15). Thus, agricultural production
1
, as a 
modality for extracting wealth from the land, was linked soon after the colony’s inception (at 
least in the mind of Governor King) to the colonial global economy. It has been a central 
motif of Australian land politics ever since. Daly takes up the connection between local land 
and global capital markets in earnest from the 1850s, but engages substantially with this idea 
from the mid-20
th
 century. Without using the term, Daly’s account pre-empts the 
contemporary scholarship on the financialization of housing and urban development. He 
suggests that the responsibility for the boom lay more with the financiers than with the 
property developers who were (and perhaps still are) often called to account in the public 
debate about housing affordability. The built environment is essential to creating and storing 
surplus value, and it continues to be heavily influenced by finance capital (cf. Aalbers 2017; 
Murphy 2017). To a considerable extent, financial controls, algorithms and funding products 
determine what gets built and where. 
 
The mining boom of the mid- to late-1960s, Daly writes, ‘expanded [the] profile of Australia 
within the international business community’ (1982, 4). Mining’s investment costs – another 
modality for extracting wealth from the land – was thought to be beyond the capacity of 
Australia’s ‘fairly primitive’ capital markets (1982, 4). Foreign banks and finance companies 
emerged in the capital vacuum, and began funding mining developments in Australia. With 
access to the growing Eurodollar
2
 market, Daly argues that the Australian banks and bankers 
were captivated by the syndication of foreign banks, which were ‘often drawn from several 
countries’, and the ‘increasing scale and increasing sophistication’ this allowed for financing 
large projects (1982, 4). As foreign capital flowed into Australia, Australia’s capital markets 
                                                 
1
 In the early days of the colony, food production was low and land grants we issued to allow for increased 
agricultural production, one aim of which was to secure the colony’s food security. 
2
 The term Eurodollar refers to United States dollar-denominated deposits held in banks outside of the United 
States and which, therefore, escape the Federal Reserve Board regulation. 
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were further enmeshed within the international system, deepening the nation’s embeddedness 
in the global economy. Sydney, where the banks and finance companies were typically 
headquartered, became an important node in a network of international financial centres 
(O’Neill et al. 2018). The city’s economy and built environment were transformed as 
manufacturing and retailing struggled and the financial sector expanded, particularly in the 
CBD. Office towers and high-rise apartments proliferated, and real estate became a third 
modality for extracting wealth from the land with global finance. 
 
With the ‘mining boom’ fading in the latter part of the 1960s (a recurring narrative in the 
Australian minerals sector) and contraction in the manufacturing sector, ‘too much money 
was chasing too few investment opportunities’ (Daly 1982, 62). Property was one of few 
avenues to which syndicated global capital seeking a local investment could ‘switch’ (Harvey 
1978). The property boom began with commercial real estate in the CBD in the mid-1960s, 
before filtering through commercial and residential real estate throughout the city later in the 
decade. The financiers did not simply facilitate other firms’ growth but grew substantially in 
their own right, further fuelling the boom that they were financing (cf. Engelen 2003). By the 
early 1970s, and with the help of the property market, ‘finance houses had moved from 
relative obscurity to hold over 26% of the Australian credit market with an estimated value of 
$17 000 million per year’ (Daly 1982, 98). 
 
The supposed security of real estate investment led to the over-production of commercial real 
estate, largely in the form of office space, which in turn suppressed rents. Increasing 
construction costs – in part due to the social movements upon which Daly scarcely dwells (cf. 
Burgmann & Burgmann 1998) – led to a diversification of investment, and commercial real 
estate activity was pushed into the residential sector. Daly argues that the transition from 
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commercial to residential real estate investment both diversified the real estate actors and 
help to produce the mum-and-dad real estate investor:  
[T]he finance companies lent to a vast range of people, and were ultimately 
responsible for the acceleration in the rate of inflation of land values in Sydney in the 
early 1970s. [They] provided most of the funds which enabled property developers to 
assume high gearing ratios and to compete outlandishly with each other for land 
parcels. Soaring prices brought rising profits and large turnovers for both financiers 
and developers, and bred a sublime optimism which allowed even higher gearing 
ratios and more unstable financial arrangements. The jangle of profits brought more 
peripheral groups into the development field with estate agents and solicitors, the 
middlemen of the industry, leading the way. The semi-professionals were followed 
by the rich amateurs: doctors, dentists and businessmen eager for a share of the 
profits. The rich were succeeded by the would-be rich, the confidence men and the 
gullible, whose backgrounds varied from farmers, to teachers, to tea-ladies, to 
gamblers, but who were united in their determination to reap the rewards offered by 
property. The finance companies funded them all. (1982, 71-2) 
 
Sources of foreign capital also evolved as the ‘boom’ mutated into residential construction. 
British firms had historically been the predominant sources of foreign capital and they were 
at the forefront of the initial period of investment in commercial office-space construction. 
But Asian firms and investors gradually became more prevalent as more, and increasingly 
risky, sites became available (Daly 1982, 69); this heightened the cultural politics of foreign 
capital and unsettled the white colonial power base (Rogers 2017; O’Neill et al. 2018), a 
point which we return to below.  
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With financialization, the “risks that were once limited to a specific actor in the production–
consumption chain become risks for all of the actors involved in a specific industry” (Aalbers 
2008, 150). Such was the case with Sydney’s subsequent property ‘bust’: Daly writes that 
“between 20 and 30 per cent of the investment in finance companies were made by public 
companies, institutions and superannuation funds; the remainder was subscribed by the 
general public. […] The victims of the corporate failures therefore included tens of thousands 
of ordinary people, and in a number of cases life savings were wiped out” (1982, 104). As 
Daly shows, the risks associated with welding the city’s fortunes to property speculation are 
borne unevenly, and often in less than transparent ways. 
 
Planning the boom 
Urban Planning is often presented as a bulwark against rapacious urban development. In 
terms of housing, ‘better planning’ should prevent the construction of (too many) 
unaffordable, low-amenity and inaccessible dwellings. Daly exposed the urban planning 
system as a policy toolkit that has been captured by developers and recalibrated to drive the 
commodification of land through subdivision and speculation – an insight that remains ever-
true today. This is a radical departure from seeking to use the planning system to provide 
housing that might lead to a more equitable city. Daly showed how urban planning was 
enrolled into the service of private property and subsequently pushed housing, via rezoning 
and subdivision, toward the city’s fringe. 
 
Thus, ‘urban renewal’ led to speculative developers placing more housing commodities into 
the housing system than the system could deal with, and a land and property boom quickly 
shifted course towards a bust. Urban planners scrambled to manage the consequences of the 
speculative development by providing, for example, public housing in sites that were ‘left 
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over’, or by reclaiming the sites of failed projects. In Woolloomooloo, as Daly recounts, a 
suite of commercial construction projects was proposed to provide office space for 90,000 
workers, but failed in the face of opposition from organised labour and residents. The NSW 
Housing Commission stepped in to purchase the land but were forced, following a High 
Court decision, to pay 125% of their initial offer because the area had been rezoned to the 
highest density zoning (1982, 67). In terms of strategic planning, the 1968 Sydney Region 
Outline Plan outlined a growth corridor strategy for the city and was dubbed ‘the punters 
guide’ by developers and speculators; any uncertainty about where to buy and when was 
clarified therein (1982, 10). Even seemingly benign activities such as the provision of new 
water infrastructure was read like a map to a ‘speculators paradise’ (1982, 118). 
 
The historical expansion of Sydney’s railway network is emblematic of this contradiction 
within urban planning. The expansion of the railway networks in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries produced new wealth for those living along the rail network and the developers that 
sought them out. The new railway and tram services to Hurstville (1884), between Hornsby 
and St Leonards (1890; later to Milsons Point), from Ashfield to Belmore (1895), as well as 
to Mosman (1897), Chatswood (1908), and Lane Cove (1909) were accompanied by land 
rezoning and subdivision, speculative land purchases, and a rapid increase in land prices. In 
1905, Daly writes, the average price of land in the Belmore-Bankstown area was £111 per 
hectare; with the extension of the railway from Belmore to Bankstown in 1909, this rose to 
£370 in 1910 and £421 in 1913 (1982, 162). While the expansion of public transportation 
produced social benefits it simultaneously produced social disadvantage through the drastic 
increase in land values, which were captured by a few land holders and then developers. Daly 
discusses the ‘Sydney Region Outline Plan and the betterment tax’ (1982, 10), a precursor to 
the contemporary discussions about ‘value capture’ on land value increases that result from 
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transit-oriented development (cf. Jones and Ley 2016). Urban planning fuelled rather than 
slowed speculative development, with planning documents and plans signalling to the 
developers where they should purchase land and anticipate a windfall. Contemporary 
parallels include the recent strategic planning of ‘growth centres’, ‘priority precincts’ and 
‘growth corridors’, and attempts to harness ‘value uplift’ on public land to finance public 
transport infrastructure in Parramatta and along the Bankstown train line in Sydney. Current 
land-banking, unsolicited proposals that pre-empt rezonings, and aggressive land assembly 
tactics in individual suburban streets (sometimes bordering on bullying) are the latest 
iterations of the same process. 
 
Daly Redux: Settler-colonialism, the context of all contexts  
The colonisation of Australia is not an historical event of the past but an ongoing process that 
merely began with the arrival of the first fleet in 1788 (Porter 2018). A ‘new policy of 1804 
meant a rational and progressive control of land policy, allowance for the first time being 
made by expansion. The Government desired to group settlers in “townships” or shires of up 
to 30,000 acres with farms radiating round centrally placed “towns”’ (Roberts 1929, 15). The 
colonial frontier pushed across the continent over half a century; a slow and often violent 
metaphorical line that would eventually dispossess Aboriginal peoples of their land. In the 
end, writes Henry Reynolds (2013, 248), the ‘settlers were engaged in the forcible transfer of 
the most productive land rights across the continent… It, too, was a transaction of global 
significance involving the seizure of control of one of the world’s greatest land masses’. 
Daly’s analysis indirectly connects to this debate from the 1850s by exposing the 
predominance and influence of British foreign capital until the latter stages of the boom of 
the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in the first half of the 1880s, Australia received 40 percent 
more funds from the United Kingdom than were received by the United States and 77 percent 
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more than Canada (1982, 154). British investment rose by 54 percent in the second half of the 
decade. Daly writes that the Sydney of the early 1880s was a ‘paradise for speculators’, 
where ‘money was plentiful, because it could be employed at twice the prevailing British 
rates of 3.5 to 5.0 percent’ and where demand could be stimulated by substantial immigration 
(1982, 158). British capital and bodies – and those of other territories of the British empire – 
were central not only during the early decades of the establishment of the Australian colonies, 
they were central to its maintenance and development over the next 200 years (Rogers 2017).  
The global movement of foreign white bodies and financial capital comprise some of the 
fundamental components for building the ‘property-owning democracy’ within these settler-
societies, where it became ‘the duty of every [white] man to have a home of his own. The 
home is the foundation of the nation’ (Phillips and Co. 1886, in Daly 1982, 132, original 
emphasis). This remains a powerful discourse today. But within this analysis Daly exposes 
the centring of the urban in the land claiming process; as the purchase of land was financed 
by city-based banks, the receipts from these purchases were redirected back to the cities and 
deposited in urban financial institutions. Thus, the control of agricultural lands was gradually 
transferred to city-based interests, which spurred on and financially underwrote urban 
development (1982, 153-4).  
 
What is striking about Daly’s analysis, then, is that despite looking toward early Australian 
history to understand the origins of a property system that is marked by booms and busts, 
Daly largely overlooks the foundational point that settler-colonialism is the context of all 
contexts when it to comes to land and housing in Australia. Ultimately, Daly locates the 
causes of booms and busts in ‘the extreme openness of Australia to the world capitalist 
economy and the demands for capital, labour and trade associated with this, and the inherent 
jerkiness of the capitalist mode of growth’ (1982, 150). With the benefit of settler-colonial 
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hindsight this is a wholly unsatisfactory colonialist diagnosis, which belies the more 
instructive analytical and political lessons that can be gained from a critical (re)reading of 
this book today.  
 
History invariably repeats: boom and bust ad infinitum? 
Read alongside subsequent critiques of settler-colonial land and housing (Porter 2018), 
Daly’s book still provides a compelling rebuttal to the presentist narrative that represents 
booms and busts as ephemeral and historically exceptional ruptures within an otherwise 
stable system of land and housing. He shows that it is this system itself, rather than any 
ruptures to it, that reproduces unequal and alienating social relations (cf. Madden & Marcuse 
2016). And thus, Daly concludes his chapter on subdivision and speculation with a diagnosis 
of the city that this system (re)produces. It is a diagnosis that will no doubt resonate with 
contemporary readers: 
At the end of it all the city had sprawled even further; services were even more 
inadequate; the young and the poor were relatively worse off; investment funds which 
might have been put into production or socially useful activities had been dissipated; 
and millions of dollars of small investors’ funds had been lost as sharks and 
charlatans grew rich. (1982, 131) 
 
Other echoes of Sydney Boom, Sydney Bust continue to reverberate around Australia and the 
world. Two years ago, Singaporean developer Koh Wee Seng had within twelve months 
successfully sold 98 percent of the 1103 off-the-plan apartments in his proposed 101-storey 
Tower 108 in Melbourne. Now, as this Thinking Space essay was poised to go to print, news 
reports emerged of Koh Wee Seng’s brother, Koh Wee Meng (famed for building budget 
hotels in Singapore’s red-light Geyland district), struggling to find off-the-plan buyers for his 
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78-storey ‘Beyoncé’ tower (so nick-named because of its curvy design) slated for a site not 
far across the Yarra from Tower 108 (Lenaghan 2018). Chinese investors are pulling out of 
capital city markets, due in part to tighter lending restrictions in Australia and in China 
(Stewart 2018). In Sydney, new real estate project launches halved in 2017 (Schlesinger 
2018). Furthermore, in Brisbane, some 52 projects totalling an estimated 10,000 apartments 
were abandoned or deferred in the 2017-2018 period (Tilley 2018). How this will inform the 
cultural politics about foreign real estate investment is unknown. What we do know is that 
over 60 per cent of Sydneysiders do not want more individual foreign investment in 
residential real estate in Sydney. But those who are financially invested in the property 
market are more likely to be supportive of foreign investment than those who are not invested 
in the property market (Rogers et al. 2018).  
 
For years, densification has proceeded on the basis of arguments put forward by property 
industry lobbyists about under-supply and affordability. This latest cycle of boom, bubble 
and bust reveals the fallacy of such arguments (Gurran et al. 2018). Even if population 
growth continues apace, when risk of failure to deliver surpluses on investment mounts, 
developers and financiers will actively retreat from the market. And if Daly’s argument holds 
true (and we believe it does), after the bust our cities will be left dealing with badly planned 
precincts, a continued under-supply of affordable housing, toxic cultural politics around 
white/colonial versus Asian global capital, and unresolved pressures on social infrastructure. 
Notwithstanding its settler-colonial overtones, Sydney Boom, Sydney Bust remains a valuable, 
integrative analysis of how finance, land and capital reshape our cities – for the worse. 
Researchers of financialisation and its impacts ought to revisit this key text to inform their 
own contemporary analyses. Those wielding power over Australian urban affairs would do 
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well to read it too, lest the lessons from Sydney Boom, Sydney Bust be ignored for another 
generation.    
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